We develop a model to study the impact of changes in price or quality sensitivity on the firm as it introduces multiple generations of a durable product where unit costs are a convex function of quality. We incorporate the psychological processes of sensitization and habituation into a model of discretionary purchasing of replacement products motivated by past experience. When price sensitivity decreases with each purchase, the firm should offer a higher quality product at a much higher price with each generation. When price sensitivity increases with each purchase (habituation), skimming is the optimal strategy. When there is sensitization followed by habituation, the firm eventually provides higher quality than the market is willing to pay for, leading to a steep drop-off in sales and profits. This analysis provides a model of the consumer behavior underlying the phenomenon of "performance oversupply" identified in the innovation literature.
Introduction
Owning and using a product can change the way consumers feel about it. As consumers gain experience with a new durable product, their preferences change. For example, a longitudinal study of purchases of rock climbing equipment by Youn, Song and MacLahan (2007) finds that brand preferences and price sensitivities evolve as consumers gain more experience with the sport over time. These changes in consumer preferences influence the demand for replacement products and should be of great interest to managers.
We often observe that a consumer will replace a durable good not because of product failure, but because he or she desires a product with greater performance. There is ample anecdotal evidence of this type of replacement buying. Some weekend golfers replace their drivers every season with the latest version, seeking a few more yards off the tee. Cyclists replace a functioning bike component with one that is marginally lighter, but certainly much more expensive. Audiophiles may buy a new piece of equipment to improve the reproduction of sounds outside the range of human hearing. Such behavior is not limited to individuals. Every year, auto racing teams spend increasing amounts of money seeking very small incremental improvements in performance. This is a very interesting yet understudied area of dynamic consumer behavior. When consumers often seek out a more advanced version of a durable product before their existing product has reached the end of its useful life, such replacement purchases are completely "discretionary" (Bayus 1992 ). However, this motivation for a replacement purchase is very different from those identified in the existing literature on durable goods. For example, low prices often spur consumers to make discretionary replacements of appliances (Bayus 1988 ).
In the case of automobiles, Bayus (1991) found that styling or image often drives discretionary replacement. Earlier survey research suggests that changed family circumstances (e.g. a new home or new job) motivates many discretionary replacement purchases (e.g., Gabor and Granger 1972; Pickering, 1975) . In this study, product performance is the key motivator for discretionary replacement buying. We assume that, as consumers gain experience with the product, their need for performance increases. This need for greater performance motivates their replacement purchases.
This type of discretionary repurchasing raises a number of interesting and important questions. For example, how should changes in product preferences be modeled? How are the optimal levels of price and quality affected by changes consumer sensitivity to price or quality? Does it matter if customers become less price sensitive or more quality sensitive with experience? More generally, how do these consumer dynamics (i.e. changes in price or quality sensitivity) affect the nature of the market (sales patterns, level of repeat purchases, profits, etc.)?
To address these questions, we build on recent theoretical research by Watheiu (2004) who considered the impact of periodic consumption on the price sensitivity on frequently consumed products (e.g. food). We examine how increases (due to sensitization) or decreases (due to habituation) in willingness to pay affect the optimal price and quality over time for a firm selling durable products to new and experienced buyers. We contrast these results with the situation in which price sensitivity is constant but quality sensitivity increases with increased experience. We also explore the implications for the firm of increasing sensitization followed by the onset of habituation.
In order to incorporate these types of changes in consumer preferences, we use a very different modeling approach rather than the typical innovation diffusion formulation used in forecasting durable goods sales (e.g. Bass 1969; Teng and Thompson 1996) . In our modeling framework, the firm's price and quality as well as consumer heterogeneity are endogenous.
We model first purchases and repeat purchases using a random utility (i.e. logit) formulation (as in Kim, Srivastava and Han 2001) . One distinction in our model is the influence of a "replacement rule" on the probability of replacement purchases. Usually, replacement purchases are modeled as function of the product's useful life (e.g. Kamakura and Balasubramanian, 1987; Bayus, 1988 ). In our model, experienced consumers only consider repurchasing if the product available is better than the one they already own (Rogers 1995) . Therefore, in order to sell to experienced buyers, the firm must offer a better product. This condition introduces significant discontinuities into the objective function for the firm, the number of which depends on how many different generations of the product were sold in the past. These discontinuities preclude a closed-form model solution. Therefore, we use on a multi-period numerical analysis to ascertain the effects of different types of preference dynamics (changing price versus quality sensitivities) on the firm's optimal price, quality and profits over a fixed number of product generations.
We further differentiate our analysis from the extant research on multi-generational durables with respect to the relationship between quality and unit cost. For products such as software, computer chips, etc., researchers usually assume that the firm faces very high development costs and very low (or zero) marginal costs (e.g., Dhebar 1994; Kornish, 2001 ).
However, in such markets, some consumers learn the patterns of price changes over time and build expectations about future price reductions (see e.g. Song and Chintagunta 2003) . In our model, we assume that quality affects the unit cost of the product. Following empirical studies of cost behavior (e.g. Foster 1994), we assume that unit marginal cost is a fixed quadratic function of quality (Balachander and Srinivasan 1994, Moorthy 1988) . This change in the assumed relationship between quality and cost allows us to examine whether the results derived under the usual assumptions of high fixed/low marginal costs generalize to the situation where higher quality drives up the cost of every product produced.
While there are empirical studies of how consumer preferences may change with experience (e.g. Kim, Srivastava, and Han 2001) , ours is the first model we know of that addresses the important consequences for the firm. In the next section, a brief literature review is followed by the basic model assumptions and optimality conditions. The results of our numerical analyses are then presented in detail. The final section summarizes our contributions and offers directions for future research.
Brief Literature Review
Much of the prior research on the evolution of consumer preferences focuses on consumer packaged goods. These studies seek to empirically determine the direction and extent of changes in price sensitivity over time (e.g., Heilman, Bowman and Wright 2000; Erdem and Sun 2001) . One recent exception is Youn, Song and MacLahan (2007) who model the longitudinal purchasing behavior of consumers of outdoor sporting goods. They find that, as consumers gain experience with rock climbing, their brand preferences and price sensitivities change. Experienced climbers tend to prefer shoes that are lighter, more flexible and provide greater sensitivity. At the same time, they become more price sensitive. While this study of sporting goods found increasing price sensitivity with experience, other research suggests alternative effects of product purchase on changes in price sensitivity.
Recent theoretical work by Wathieu (2004) examines the impact of consumption over time on price sensitivity. Using results from the behavior psychology literature (e.g.
McSweeney, Hinson and Cannon, 1996) , Wathieu (2004) suggests that consumption over time could lead price sensitivity to evolve along one of two distinct paths: sensitization or habituation. If it does occur, sensitization is usually associated with the initial stages of consumption. At this stage, customers become increasingly interested in consuming the product as they experience the promised benefits. Sensitization results in an increase a consumer's willingness to pay for a product as they continue to consume it over time (Wathieu 2004) . The sensitization stage has parallels with addictive processes since current consumption leads to an increase in future consumption (Becker and Murphy 1988) .
In the case of some durable products, sensitization is a by-product of increased experience with the product which, in turn, increases a consumer's expertise and familiarity (Hoch and Deighton 1989) while reducing perceived risk. Zhao, Meyer and Han (2005) find that consumers are often attracted to new versions of products that offer additional features, even if these features are never used. In our model, sensitization can result in a reduced sensitivity to price or increased sensitivity to quality when it comes to choosing a nextgeneration, replacement product.
Over time, continued consumption usually leads to habituation. As consumers get accustomed to consuming the same product over and over, their interest may wane and their willingness to pay to consumer the exact same product decreases. In markets for frequently purchased packed goods, consumers may engage in variety-seeking behavior (McAlister and Pessemier, 1982) or they may stockpile the product when it is on sale. For frequently purchased products, the onset of habituation depends on frequency and intensity of consumption (Wathieu, 2004) .
For some durable products, an increased sensitivity to price leading to a reduced willingness to pay for a discretionary replacement could occur with the first purchase. For example, Thompson, Hamilton and Rust (2005) found that consumers can be overwhelmed by the complexity of new products with a great variety of features. Their experimental work finds that consumers can suffer from "feature fatigue" which reduces their interest in "new and improved" models of products already owned.
In our study, we model the how influences of sensitization and habituation -first separately then together -affect the willingness of consumers to purchase replacement products. By incorporating these aspects of heterogeneity into a model of consumer demand, we examine how the firm's decisions regarding price and quality change over successive generations. In addition, we investigate how differences in consumer dynamics (i.e. change in price versus quality sensitivity with usage) affect the macro-level outcomes of overall sales, depth of repeat purchasing and profitability.
Model Formulation
In order to isolate the effects of changes in price or quality sensitivity on repeat purchases, we limit our analysis to the situation of a monopolist setting the profit maximizing price and quality of a single product over a number of "generations." This is consistent with the analytical models of a durable goods monopolist introducing sequential innovations (e.g., Dhebar 1994; Kornish, 2001 ). However, we depart from this stream of research regarding the relationship between quality and unit costs. While Dhebar (1994) and Kornish (2001) assume zero marginal costs, we assume that marginal costs are endogenously determined by the level of quality set by the firm.
We further depart from the existing literature on "upgrade" purchasing wherein the firm can price discriminate based on previous purchasing (Fudenberg and Tirole 1998) . We assume that, in a given generation, the firm charges the same price and provides the same quality level for all consumers.
The monopolist's profit in generation g is determined by:
In generation g, P g is price, MC g is marginal cost, S g is sales, and M is the size of the potential market. As in aggregate models of new product sales (e.g. Bass 1969 ) and prior work on monopoly pricing (e.g., Coase 1972), we assume that the size of the potential market (M) is fixed.
Sales in a given generation (S g ) are the sum of the purchase probabilities for all consumers that purchase in generation g (see, for example, Kim, Srivastava and Han 2001) .
These probabilities are determined at the individual consumer level by the current price and quality as well as the consumer's purchase history. As in Moorthy and Png (1992) , the quality variable represents all non-price product attributes such as performance, reliability, durability, and so on (Garvin, 1987) .
The extant research on multi-generational durables such as software, computer chips, etc. assumes that the firm faces very high development costs and very low marginal costs 2 .
In such markets, firms usually practice skim pricing (e.g. Beskano and Wilson 1990). By setting initial prices high and reducing them later, the firm maximize profits via price discrimination. However, in such markets, some consumers learn the patterns of price changes over time and build expectations about future price reductions (see, e.g., Song and Chintagunta 2003) . Some forward-looking consumers may delay purchasing and wait for the price to fall. The composition of the market with regard to the number of consumers who will purchase immediately versus waiting has an important impact of the firm's pricing over time. In models where quality is endogenously set, fixed spending on R&D determines the level of quality offered to customers (Fishman and Rob, 2000) .
In our model, we consider a very different relationship between costs and quality. As noted above, the extant literature generally assumes that, in order to attain a desired level of quality, the firm must invest in a given level of fixed investment. In our model, the influence of quality on costs is variable. Specifically, we assume that unit marginal cost is a fixed quadratic function of quality. This assumption is consistent with empirical studies of cost behavior (e.g., Foster 1994) as well as prior analytical research (Balachander and Srinivasan 1994, Moorthy 1988 ). In addition, we assume zero fixed costs.
Unit marginal cost as a function of quality is given by:
The cost intercept and coefficients are represented by r 0 , r 1 and r 2 respectively are fixed to reflect a constant technology frontier.
Clearly, this represents a very different type of cost structure for the firm. This assumption has implications for the consumer as well. Since providing higher levels of quality cost the firm more, consumers should not expect that prices will fall over time. By using this type of cost structure, we can examine the sensitivity of results from prior research to changes in the nature of the relationship between costs and quality.
In the first period, the monopolist chooses quality (X) and price (P) to solve:
Note that generation g is of undetermined length. It could be months or years. Each period represents a single generation of the durable product.
Consumer Demand Model
Our model of consumer demand is based on a random utility model and involves both first purchases and discretionary replacements (e.g., Kim, Srivastava and Han, 2001 ).
As in Youn, Song and MacLachlan (2007) , we assume uniform rate of consumption, so that each consumer who makes a purchase uses the product at the same rate.
The utility g µ of a product in generation g is given by:
where:
• X g is the quality level for generation g
• Φ 0 is a fixed market-level propensity for purchase in this category 3 .
• c β represents the consumer's sensitivity to quality (Nevo 2000) , which changes according to the number of purchases (c) the consumer has made • P g is the price of the product in generation g • c α is the price sensitivity, which changes according to the number of purchases (c) a consumer has made
The two utility equations reflect differences in the way in which a prior purchase can affect consumers. We consider the situations in which price sensitivity (Equation 4) or quality sensitivity (Equation 5) change with each purchase. In our model, preferences evolve due to purchase experience, not simply due to the passage of time.
The probability of purchase Pr g,c for consumers in generation g given c, the number of purchases already made is formulated as a logit model (Equation 6). After having purchased the product, consumers will only consider repurchasing if the quality of the current generation product is superior to the quality of product purchased most recently. We refer to this constraint as a "replacement rule." This condition reflects the situation in which replacement will not be considered until a better, more capable, or more powerful version becomes available.
At the individual level, the probability of purchase is given by:
The sales (S g ) in any generation g are equal to the sum of all these probabilities across all consumers. As in prior research on multi-generational purchasing (e.g. Dhebar, 1994; Kornish, 2001) , we assume consumers buy no more than one unit in each generation and there is no secondary market for used products.
Consumer Price/Quality Sensitivity Dynamics
Before their first purchase, we assume that all consumers have the same price and quality sensitivities. As noted above, we analyze two separate situations. In one set of analyses, we allow the consumer's price sensitivity ( c α ) to vary according to his or her history of purchases. In the other set of analyses, we allow quality sensitivity (β c ) to vary based on the consumer's purchase history. For expositional simplicity, we next describe the first situation in which price sensitivity changes with each purchase. A similar intuition is applied to the situations where quality sensitivity changes with each purchase.
In the first generation, all consumers decide on whether or not to buy the product for the first time. At the end of this generation, there are two different groups of consumers. The first consists of those who bought the product. Their experience with the product has changed their price sensitivity. The size of this group is given by M (Pr 1,1 ) and their price sensitivity is α 1 . The second is the group of customers that did not buy it, with size M(1-Pr 1,1 ) and price sensitivity α 0 . This is illustrated in Figure 1 .
Insert Figure 1 here
In the second generation, the group of consumers that did not purchase yet decides whether to purchase or not for the first time with probability Pr 2,1 while the group of consumers that already purchased once decides whether to repurchase or not with probability Pr 2,2 . Recall that members of this latter group will only consider repurchasing if the quality of the new generation is higher that the product he or she already owns.
At the end of the second generation, there are four types of customers. Their price sensitivity varies from α 0 to α 1 and α 2 according to the total number of purchases each has made in previous periods. This process is repeated for all generations. The total sales in any generation g is given by the sum of all probabilities across all 2 g segments of consumers.
Each segment is associated with a different price sensitivity and a different level of quality necessary to motive replacement buying.
Optimality Conditions
Since we are dealing with a profit maximizing monopolist, identifying the existence of an optimal level of price and quality is fairly straightforward. Assuming full information (in all generations), all consumers are exposed to the optimal price * g P and quality
In the first period, the first order conditions are given by:
Any level of price and quality (P*,X*) satisfying these conditions would be a maximum point if the Hessian of function Π(P,X) is negative definite when evaluated at this point. Since the logit function is smooth and well-behaved, there is little problem in identifying the optimal price and quality in the first period for any set of parameters.
However, in subsequent generations, the firm's profit function changes from one that is well-behaved and continuous to one characterized by discontinuities. These discontinuities are the result of the replacement rule. Recall that an experienced customer will only consider a replacement purchase if the quality of the current generation product is superior to that of the product the customer last purchased. For example, in the second generation, if the firm considers quality levels below the optimal level associated with the first period (i.e., * 1 X ), demand will only come from those consumers who have yet to purchase. However, above this value, the profit function includes repeat purchases. Due to this discontinuity, we have a piece-wise continuous objective function. In Figure 2 , we illustrate the discontinuity in profit function at the second period, given the optimal quality level of the first period ( * 1 X ).
Insert Figure 2 about here
Due to these discontinuities, we have to follow a multiple step process to identify the optimal price and quality in every generation beyond the initial one. First, we determine the boundaries of the sub-spaces of the quality variable. These correspond to the quality levels offered in the past at which consumers had made purchases. Then, for each of these subspaces, we identify a price and quality level that maximizes the objective function over the sub-space. We then compare the level of the objective function for all of the sub-spaces to determine the global maximum.
Unfortunately, the objective function for the firm has no closed form solution given the two influences of past purchasing on the optimal price and quality for a given generation of the product. First, the number of purchases made by each individual consumer affects either the price or quality sensitivity. Second, depending on the generation in which a given consumer made his or her last purchase, each will have a different quality hurdle for repurchasing. For these reasons, we decided to rely on a numerical analysis which is described in detail in the next section.
Study Design

Baseline Numerical Solution
In order to compare results across different situations of changing price or quality sensitivities (based on purchase history), we identified a set of parameters that creates a realistic baseline (e.g., positive profits) against which we could analyze relative movements.
We fixed the market potential at 100. For the cost parameters, we used the following: (r 0 = 1, r 1 = 0.4, r 2 = 0.05). This cost function allows some influence of the quadratic term on marginal costs. The initial price and quality sensitivities were set to unity (α 0 = β 0 = 1.0). The baseline market-level propensity for category purchase was (Φ 0 = -1.9). Using this baseline utility, the optimal price and quality for the first generation is X*= 6 and P* = 6.3. This results in a profit of 10.9 and a first period trial rate of 9.9%. This is within the boundaries of the typical size of the early adopter segment in the Bass model (Mahajan, Muller and Wind 2000) . This level of price and quality satisfies both the first order and second order conditions noted above 4 .
Scenario Design
Our analysis departs from the baseline where all purchases are first purchases (i.e., in the first generation) and all coefficients are fixed (the parameters were presented in the previous section). We analyzed four scenarios by changing separately price and quality sensitivity as shown in Figure 3 .
Insert Figure 3 here
We ran our analysis over ten generations. In scenario A, we decrease price sensitivity for the individual at three different rates (i.e., -0.01, -0.05, -0.10) each time there is a purchase. In scenario B, we increase price sensitivity linearly at the rate of 0.05 for every purchase 5 . In scenario C, we increase quality sensitivity at rate of 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 per purchase. We only modeled case of increasing quality sensitivity because when consumers seek to make replacement purchase, we assume they do so because they desire additional performance. Therefore, we did not model the case of quality sensitivity decreasing after purchase.
Scenario D is the sensitization-habituation scenario. Here, the price sensitivity is decreasing during the first periods, corresponding to the sensitization stage. The minimum price sensitivity is reached either after the third or sixth purchase. At this point, habituation begins and price sensitivity increases with every subsequent purchase. For this scenario, the per-purchase rate of change is -0.10 for sensitization and +0.10 for habituation.
One important simplification in our numerical analysis is the operationalization of the replacement rule. We assume that the current generation product need only have strictly higher levels of quality in order to be considered for purchase by consumers who already own a previous generation of the product. In reality, we would expect that any new product would have to offer demonstrably better quality, at least above a "just noticeable difference."
If we were to specify the size of the required quality premium, say 25%, this would merely serve to change the point in the quality space where the discontinuities occur. In the case of end-point optima, the resulting quality level offered in the market would increase accompanied by an increase in marginal costs. The absolute change in profits would depend on the price coefficients. However, we found there to be no change in the qualitative nature of the results. Therefore, we used the assumption of requiring only strict increase in quality for repurchase to be considered.
Results
For each of the scenarios, we present the optimal levels of price, quality, value (quality/price), unit sales and profits (undiscounted) scaled with respect to the first generation (= 1.0). We also present the proportion of repeat purchases by generation.
Scenario A: Progressive Price Sensitization (Linearly Decreasing Price Sensitivity)
When a consumer's price sensitivity is reduced with each purchase, the firm's optimal strategy is to offer small increases in quality accompanied by greater increases in prices (see Figures 4A 4B ). These differences are more pronounced when the decrease in price sensitivity per purchase is larger (0.10 versus 0.01).
Figure 4 about here
The overall result of this strategy is a reduction in the value of firm's offering with each generation compared to the first generation product (see Figure 4C ). This result is quite different from the results obtained by Kornish (2001) who assumed zero marginal costs and exogenously set quality. In her model, a firm either follows a low initial price strategy or focuses on customers with the highest valuation for the product. In the former case, the first period price is set low to attract as many buyers as possible. In the second period, the price of the greatly improved product is set higher in order to continued to be attractive to those consumers placing the greatest value on the product. The high valuation consumers are the focus in the first period when the firm employs the latter strategy. Here, the first period price is set high. Some low valuation customers buy in the second period (as do the high valuation customers) when the greatly improved replacement product in introduced at an increased, but very attractive price. While Kornish's (2001) analysis does not explicitly model the relationship between price and quality, it seems clear that, for both strategies, the firm increases the value for customers in the second period order to spur repeat purchases.
Our analysis suggests that if quality is expensive, then the firm can increase profits by offering a higher quality product at much higher price. This results in the offering having a lower relative value with each successive generation. This is due to the influence of experience on price sensitivities. The consumer who has already purchased the product has lower price sensitivity than those who have yet to buy the product. Some of these experienced consumers are willing to repurchase in future periods. Total sales consisting of replacement sales along with sales to remaining potential first time buyers generally increase over time (see Figure 4D ). With each generation, the proportion of repeat sales increases (see Figure   4E ).
One interesting result is the peaking of unit sales in later generations when the reductions in price sensitivity are the greatest (0.10). In this situation, we see that the value of the firm's offering is lower with each successive generation. Even though sales fall off after the eighth generation, overall profits continue to be high due to the number of experienced customers continuing to buy despite prices climbing much faster than quality.
Scenario B: Immediate Habituation (Linearly Increasing Price Sensitivity)
In this scenario, when a customer purchases the product, his or her price sensitivity increases. In this case, the optimal strategy for the firm is to keep quality fixed and slightly reduce the price over time 6 . The price reductions, overall, are small. This is a sharp contrast with scenario A (i.e. consumer price sensitivity declines with each purchase) wherein by the tenth generation prices had increased 70% and quality had increased almost 50%.
Figure 5 about here
With each generation, more consumers try the product. However, there are no repeat purchases and profits fall with each generation (see Figure 5 ).
It is interesting to note that the firm in this situation seems to be exhibiting classical skim pricing behavior. It is useful to point out, however, that the assumptions underlying the model presented here are very different from those usually associated with models of skim pricing. For example, the extant research assumes a heterogeneous distribution of consumers, some of whom would value buying the product more than others (this is operationalized by reservation prices in Coase 1972) . It is further assumed that consumers make only one purchase of the infinitely durable product. Quality is usually assumed to be fixed and the cost structure is one of low unit costs and high fixed costs. Our model relies on very different assumptions. Our consumers start out as being homogeneous, only changing as they purchase the product and become more price sensitive. They would make replacement purchases if the quality were sufficiently high. Quality is endogenous and we assume that fixed costs are zero and unit costs are a quadratic function of quality. In the current literature on monopolists using price discrimination over time, the usual assumption is consumers are forward looking.
The consumers in our model are myopic. Yet, the optimal strategy for the firm is the same, i.e. reduce prices over time as the market saturates. This suggests that skim pricing is an optimal strategy in a much wider range of situations than have been studied to date. 6 The results are essentially identical (within machine error) for the three cases of increasing price sensitivity by 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 per purchase. They are omitted to conserve space and are available from the authors.
Scenario C: Progressive Quality Sensitization (Linearly Increasing Quality
Sensitivity)
In this scenario, a consumer's quality sensitivity increases with each purchase. To highlight the differences between sensitization through increasing quality sensitivity (this scenario) and through decreasing price sensitivity (Scenario A), we examined the differences in prices, quality, etc. for per purchase changes of 0.10 to either quality or price sensitivity 7 .
The results are presented in Figure 6 .
Figure 6 about here
As in the case where consumers become more price sensitive with each purchase, the optimal strategy for the firm is to increase both price and quality when experience leads consumers to become more sensitive to quality (See Figures 6A and 6B) . However, the optimal levels of price and quality are relatively lower than in Scenario A (decreasing price sensitivity). As before, the first generation product continues to offer the best value.
However, if consumers become increasingly sensitive to quality with each purchase, the optimal product has higher levels of value in each generation than in Scenario A (See Figure   6C ).
Unit sales continue to increase with every generation and do not fall off as in Scenario
A (See Figure 6D) . The reduced levels of price and quality offered by the firm in this scenario result in profits that are comparable but lower than those of the firm in Scenario A (decreasing price sensitivity). The average (undiscounted) difference in profits is about 7% lower which is significant at the p < 0.03 level (paired comparison t-statistic = 2.74, twotailed test).
Scenario D: Price Sensitization Followed by Habituation
In this scenario, price sensitivity varies according to the pattern identified in the sensitization-habituation literature (Wathieu 2004) . During sensitization, a consumer's price sensitivity decreases with each purchase. However, after a number of purchases, the consumer becomes satisfied with the product last purchased and his or her price sensitivity increases. We modeled two situations, one in which habituation occurs after the third purchase and the other in which habituation occurs only after the sixth purchase (recall that in Scenario A, habituation did not occur regardless of the number of replacement purchases by the consumers). We determined the optimal price and quality for the firm across the generations for the same baseline case used in the other scenarios. We used a sensitization and habituation rate of 0.10 per purchase. The results are presented in Figure 7 . In order to illustrate the effects of the onset of habituation among consumers making replacement purchases over time, we included the results from Scenario A in the figures.
Figure 7 about here
We see the impact of habituation in the lower levels of price and quality, especially after the fourth generation (see Figures 7A and B) . At this point, some of the first generation buyers will have made multiple replacement purchases and would have reached habituation.
These consumers became more price sensitive, leading to a low likelihood of further purchasing. The value of the firm's offering is relatively higher when habituation sets in earlier ( Figure 7C ). In addition, unit sales peak earlier when habituation occurs earlier ( Figure   7D ). It is probably a coincidence that unit in the market with earlier onset of habituation peaks in the same generation as Scenario A where there is no habituation.
As might be expected from its dampening effect on price increases, habituation reduces the firm's profits. Profits are lower for the earlier onset case (3 purchases) since it takes fewer repurchases to get to the point that consumers leave the market ( Figure 7F ).
However, profits in both situations continue to increase for every generation.
Effect of Trial Rate
In the baseline case, the initial trial rate (corresponding to the unit sales in the first generation) were about 10% for every analysis reported so far. We decided to explore how the onset of habituation affects the firm if the initial trial rate were much higher. Therefore, we changed the baseline market-level propensity for category purchase (β 0 ) to result in an initial trial rate of 25%. The results are presented in Figure 8 .
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Comparing the price and quality trajectories for the two different initial trial rates ( Figures 8A and 8B versus Figure 7A and 7B), we see each reaches a plateau when the initial trial rate is higher (25% versus 10%). The timing of the plateau coincides with the onset of habituation. It is very interesting to note that after quality has reached its highest point, the firm starts to reduce prices to motivate more repeat and initial purchases ( Figures 8C & 8E) .
However, since the initial trial rate was very relatively high, the number of consumers attracted to a product with higher value is relatively small (compared to the 10% initial trial rate case). This leads to a dramatic fall off in sales after the sixth generation ( Figure 8D ).
When habituation is delayed until after the sixth purchase, the firm can continue to sell high quality and very high priced products to a narrowing group of repeat buyers and some new buyers. However, the increase in unit revenue cannot off-set the fall in unit sales and overall profits slump severely after the eighth generation ( Figure 8F ).
Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper, we develop a model to understand how changes in price or quality sensitivity affect the firm's optimal price and quality as it introduces multiple generations of a durable good. Our model differs from the extant literature in two other respects:
replacement purchase motivation and cost structure. The consumers in our model are motivated to purchase a replacement product if the current generation offers better quality than the product most recently purchased (Rogers 1995) . With respect to cost structure, we follow the empirical research on cost behavior (e.g. Foster 1994 ) and assume that there are high costs associated with endowing each unit of the product with high quality (i.e. unit costs are a quadratic function of quality). Together, these differences provide valuable insight into durable good pricing in markets not characterized by the typical cost and demand assumptions used in the extant literature.
When price sensitivity decreases with each purchase (Scenario A), the optimal strategy for the firm is to offer a higher quality product at a much higher price. We actually observe this type of pricing behavior in markets where providing higher quality is very expensive. For example, consider the market for high performance cycling parts used in racing. In order to maximize his or her speed, a cyclist wants the lightest possible bicycle frame and components. At the same time, the materials used must be very strong in order to safely endure the strains of racing. These demands result in situations such as a 2.8 pound bicycle frame selling for $4100 at the same time that a frame weighting slightly more (3.1 ponds) costs only half as much (Pressman 2005) .
In contrast to the recreational rock climbers studied by Youn, Song and MacLahan (2007) , as competitive athletes progress in their sport, their price sensitivity often diminishes.
They have an extremely high willingness to pay for marginally higher quality. In bicycle case cited above, higher quality materials lead to reduced weight. Such behavior on the part of consumers may seem irrational, appearing similar to addiction. However, depending on the circumstances, the greatly increased price for a marginal gain in quality could be well justified. One clear example is equipment markets for sports such as golf, tennis, bass fishing or auto racing. What these sports have in common is a tournament payoff structure. That is, the payoff for finishing first (e.g., winning the U.S. Open, Indy 500 or Tour de France) is dramatically higher than the reward for those who finish second. At the highest levels of competition, athletes continually replace functioning equipment with new versions that have slightly higher performance and substantially higher prices. Under a tournament payoff structure, the additional expenditure contributing to even slightly improved performance may be rewarded.
When price sensitivity increases with each purchase (Scenario B), the optimal strategy is a skim pricing strategy. The firm sets a constant level of quality and reduces price over time as the market saturates. As noted above, this finding arises from a model that changes almost all of the assumptions regarding consumers (heterogeneity, forward looking v. myopic, single purchase v. replacement buying) and costs (nature of relationship between fixed and variable) that are used in the current literature.
This is a very interesting finding. There is an emerging stream of literature documenting changes in consumer price sensitivities with experience (e.g. Youn, Song and MacLahan 2007) . This is the first paper we know of to incorporate these changes into a model of firm pricing and quality setting behavior for durable products. It seems that incorporating the single change in consumer behavior from a fixed distribution of price sensitivities to one that evolves due to purchase behavior greatly expands the number of situations under which skim pricing may be the optimal strategy. An interesting area for future research would be to explore how differences in the firm's cost structure (e.g. impact of quadratic and linear terms) affect these results presented here.
Building on Wathieu (2004)'s exploration of how sensitization and habituation affects consumers, we illustrate its effects on the firm (Scenario D). We see that an earlier onset of habituation reduces the firm's price, quality, sales and profits. Furthermore, if successful in attracting a large number of buyers in the first period, the firm may find itself providing higher quality than the market is willing to pay for. The onset of habituation results in a steep fall-off in profits after generations of successful product introductions.
This overshooting of quality is well-know and given the name, "performance oversupply" by Christensen (1997) . Market leading firms are rewarded with increasing profits over time by supplying additional performance and charging extra for it. These firms tend to assume consumers will be consistently interested in higher levels of performance, regardless of price (consistent with Scenario A). However, in industry after industry Christensen (1997) finds firms tend to provide more performance than consumers need or are willing to pay for and eventually suffer the consequences of a steep drop-off in sales and profits.
In his case-based research, Christensen (1997) only provides a description of this phenomenon, not an explanation of why it occurs. As a result of our study, we propose a that performance oversupply occurs due to the inflexion point between the sensitization and habituation processes. Consumers may continue to be interested in performance, but are not willing to pay for higher levels due to habituation. Since the product has a long life, consumers need not repurchase the latest generation, leading to a steep drop off in sales and profits. Once habituation arises, the best course of action for the firm is to try to profit from the consumers who had never bought the product ( Figure 5C ). However, this approach is short-lived and of limited value.
Limitations
As in Chintagunta and Rao (1996) , we assumed consumers are homogeneous with respect to their change in preferences with each purchase. Future research might allow ownership (purchase) and consumption (usage) to vary separately. Also, we assumed homogeneous preferences at the beginning of the first period, a fixed market size and constant technology (as embodied in the cost structure). Relaxing these assumptions will provide very interesting avenues for future research.
In summary, we model the how influences of sensitization and habituation -first separately then together -affect the willingness of consumers to purchase replacement products in a durable good market. By incorporating these aspects of consumer heterogeneity into a model of consumer demand, we examine how the firm's decisions regarding price and quality change over successive generations. The findings of our numerical analyses provide insights into pricing behavior in understudied durable goods markets, specifically those in which providing consumers higher quality products increases marginal costs. 
